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Executive Summary 
 
 
Our rapid review of the academic and grey literature revealed that the links between poverty, 
poaching and trafficking are under-researched and poorly understood. Yet, the assumption 
that poaching occurs because of poverty is omnipresent, with little ‘hard evidence’ to support 
the claim. Despite this, we are confident that the links are there, based on the evidence that 
we gathered. However, our understandings are hampered by a series of factors: trafficking 
and poaching are overwhelmingly framed as an issue of conservation/biodiversity loss rather 
than of poverty and development; it is difficult to collect clear and detailed data on poaching 
precisely because of its illicit nature; and many of the cases we examined are also linked in 
with conflict zones, making research even more challenging.  Nevertheless, our key findings 
are as follows: 
 
1. Poaching in Sub Saharan African was produced via the historical legacy of 
colonialism 
2. Poverty is directly and indirectly linked to poaching and trafficking of ivory and rhino 
horn from Sub-Saharan Africa 
3. There are different types of poachers, and they require different policy responses 
4. Poaching and trafficking of ivory and rhino horn are ultimately driven by wealth and 
not by poverty per se.  
5. We need a much better understanding of the relationships between poverty and 
individual poacher motivation 
6. The evidence base for claims around poverty as a driver of ivory and rhino poaching 
is thin, but that does not mean that poverty is not an important factor 
7. There are direct links between conflict zones, illegal killing of wildlife, trafficking and 
poverty.  
8. Trafficking can increase poverty  
 
 
We then summarise the main policy responses, identifying their strengths and weaknesses. 
These include: 
 
1. Changing people’s behaviour via negative incentives (e.g. monitoring compliance 
with rules and penalising detected rule breakers), positive incentives and distractions. 
2. The development of tourism as a route to poverty reduction. 
3. Legalisation of the ivory and rhino horn trade at the international level, including 
arguments around its potential impact on community based natural resource 
management schemes.  
 
Finally, we offer a series of short case studies that indicate these complex linkages via an 
analysis of particular examples.  
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SECTION 1 
Key findings 
 
 
Key finding 1 
Poaching in Sub Saharan Africa was produced via the historical legacy of colonialism  
 
One of the legacies of colonialism was that legal rights to hunt were removed from Africans 
in order to protect sport hunting and the safari industry for European colonisers (Adams 
2004; Jacoby, 2003; Neumann, 2004). This process of enclosure removed rights to 
subsistence hunting and further impoverished African communities. This also partly explains 
why some communities in Sub-Saharan Africa continue to resist and ignore legislation 
protecting wildlife because they believe they have a right to access and use wildlife as they 
have done for generations (Duffy, 2010; Neuman, 2001; Carruthers, 1995; Robbins et al. 
2009; Bolaane, 2004; Mackenzie, 1988; Norgrove and Hulme, 2006; Adams 2004: 19-24; 
Roe, 2008b; Garland, 2008; Neumann, 1998; Fischer et al. 2013). 
 
Key finding 2 
Poverty is directly and indirectly linked to poaching and trafficking of ivory and rhino 
horn from Sub-Saharan Africa  
 
This set of issues squarely fits under Millennium Development Goal 7, Ensure Environmental 
Sustainability. The UN states that MDG7 can be achieved via a series of targets, one of 
which is target 7b: reduce biodiversity loss, achieving by 2010, a significant reduction in the 
rate of loss1 (also see Roe et al. 2011; Roe and Elliot (eds) 2010). 
 
In order to respond effectively to the links between poverty, trafficking and poaching in Sub-
Saharan Africa, we need to understand how it developed. There is no easy link between 
poverty and trafficking. Adams et al. (2004) distinguished four key arguments in the 
conservation-poverty debate:  
 
(a) Conservation and poverty are separate policy realms 
(b) Conservation should not compromise poverty reduction 
(c) Poverty impedes conservation because poaching and environmental degradation is 
often pursued by the poor in short-sighted ways. When people become richer they 
are more amenable to accepting conservation policies. Addressing poverty is 
therefore a means of directly and indirectly promoting conservation. 
(d) Poverty reduction depends on sustainable resource use. Where livelihoods depend 
on living resources their sustainable use will promote both the resource and the 
livelihood associated with it. 
 
In order to achieve MDG 7, it is important to explore further the links between wildlife 
trafficking, poaching and poverty. It is useful to note one of the Key Performance Indicators 
of MDG 7 is setting aside 10% of land as protected area, which reveals the centrality and 
importance of such models of conservation. Wildlife conservationists and development 
                                               
1
 http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/environ.shtml 
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specialists tend to accept the blunt definitions and stereotypes around poaching (notably the 
circular argument that poor people poach because they are poor). For example, the 
International Conservation Caucus Foundation (ICCF), which under pins the International 
Conservation Caucus, involving one third of the membership of the US Congress, states: 
 
‘The extreme poverty of many African communities induces their complicity in 
African-based, Asian-run poaching networks. The demand for ivory has surged to 
the point that the tusks of a single adult elephant can be worth more than 10 times 
the average annual income in many African countries’2. 
 
The ICCF, along with other governments, NGOs and private sector conservation 
organisations are increasingly involved in pushing forward a global position that Africa is 
facing an unprecedented poaching crisis; it is claimed that the crisis is orchestrated by 
organised criminal networks, but ultimately facilitated by poverty (see recent statements by 
conservation NGOs including WWF- International, Conservation International. IFAW, Wildlife 
Conservation Society etc). Conversely, a brief search of Oxfam, Care International and 
UNDP revealed no documents relating to poaching or trafficking. This means that a complex 
social question has been largely framed as a question around the impact on wildlife rather 
than on people. Our literature search revealed that trafficking and poaching are extremely 
complex and require an understanding of the global networks involved in organising 
poaching and trafficking, individual motivations, the opportunities afforded local people to 
poach, the incentives not to engage in poaching and the inter-relationship with conflict zones 
in Africa.  
 
Key finding 3 
There are different types of poachers, and they require different policy responses  
 
Subsistence poachers: typically target small game (e.g. antelope) and hunt to meet food 
needs. Subsistence poaching is characterised by low technology (e.g. use of traps and 
snares) and tends to have a minimal impact on wildlife populations (Mackenzie, 1988; 
Adams, 2004; Fischer et al. 2013: 264; Adams et al. 2009). However, the use of non-
selective hunting technologies can be detrimental to species that are both of conservation 
concern and critical to nature-based tourism including elephant, lion and wild dog (Becker et 
al. 2013). 
 
Commercial poachers: typically operate within organised groups that target commercially 
valuable species e.g. rhinos and elephants. Commercial poachers may use different, 
typically more advanced technologies including firearms, GPS, mobile phones etc. 
Commercial poaching can have a devastating impact on wildlife populations (e.g. elephant 
populations in Eastern Africa in the 1980s) (see Leakey 2001; Brockington, Duffy and Igoe, 
2008: 77-78; Duffy, 2010: 79-113). 
  
Emerging and hybrid forms of poachers: commercial versus subsistence poachers are two 
blunt categories. However the boundaries can be blurred at the margins. The rise in 
commercial hunting for bushmeat, for example, shows how traditional subsistence hunting 
has been transformed in response to the arrival of logging companies in remote forests, 
where a workforce has to be fed, or transport links give easier access to urban markets.  
Redford (1992) coined the phrase ‘empty forests’ to indicate how commercial hunting 
depletes forests of fauna, which has a knock-on effect on local access to small game as 
sources of protein. In a similar vein, poaching as part of a conflict strategy (discussed below) 
cannot be easily categorised as subsistence or commercial since it blends elements of both 
                                               
2
 http://iccfoundation.us/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=445&Itemid=367; 
also see Corson (2010) for further discussion of ICCF. 
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(Duffy, 2010: 155-187; Brockington, Duffy and Igoe, 2008: 77-78; also see Alvard et al. 
1997; Bodmer and Lozano, 2001; Lowassa et al. 2012). 
 
Key finding 4 
Poaching and trafficking of ivory and rhino horn are ultimately driven by wealth and 
not by poverty per se 
 
While poverty may encourage people to poach, poverty per se is not necessarily the driver 
or initiator of poaching.  Individuals from poor communities would not engage in the 
poaching of commercially valuable species unless there was demand from wealthier 
communities (TRAFFIC 2008; IFAW, 2008; Duffy 2010: 155-187). The reasons for poaching 
tend not to be thoroughly investigated in NGO campaigns because in the past, it was the fact 
that animals were being poached that was the key driving issue (Peluso 1993: 205-9). A 
recent IUCN report on elephant meat trade in the Central African region concluded that 
demand from wealthier communities was a key stimulus for illegal hunting (Stiles, 2011). 
Wealthy industrial economies remain major legal and illegal importers of wildlife. In 2008 a 
report by TRAFFIC-ASIA examined the drivers of the illegal wildlife trade, and concluded 
that the increase in illegal trading of wildlife was directly related to the rise in incomes in the 
region. The report detailed the complexity of the networks involved in the wildlife trade: it 
linked local-level rural harvesters, professional hunters, traders, wholesalers and retailers 
with the final consumers of wildlife, in locations distant from the source of the product. The 
illegal wildlife trade provides varying levels of economic support to different communities: a 
source of regular income, a safety net or as profitable business (TRAFFIC, 2008)  
 
Key finding 5 
We need a much better understanding of the relationships between poverty and 
individual poacher motivation 
 
Tackling poaching requires an understanding of human decision making. The decision to 
poach or not is decided by an individual, but is shaped by the social, political and economic 
context in which that individual finds themselves. When making decisions people are 
influenced by economic considerations, social-psychological factors, and an understanding 
of how they are expected to behave in society. Conservation and natural resource 
management interventions frequently attempt to change human behaviour whether it be by 
encouraging the adoption of agri-environment schemes (Hounsome et al. 2006), reducing 
poaching in protected areas (Jachmann 2008a) or limiting resource extraction (Gelcich et al. 
2005). However, interventions may be most successful when based upon an understanding 
of factors driving individual decision-making. An understanding of factors driving poaching 
behaviour can help us to: change people's motivations so livelihood strategies are altered; 
structure incentive schemes; balance patrols and fines in law enforcement; and predict the 
effects of individual and collective decision making upon natural resources including 
elephant and rhino populations (St. John et al. 2013; Ostrom, 2010). This needs to be done 
in conjunction with tackling underlying social, economic and political reasons for why a 
person engages in poaching in the first place (Peluso 1993; Duffy, 2010; Jacoby 2003; 
Ostrom et al. 1999; Dowie, 2009; Adams, 2009; MacKenzie, 1988)  
 
Economic models of human behaviour: economic analyses of human behaviour are 
traditionally underpinned by a model of rational choice whereby rational decision makers aim 
to maximize their utility – the level of satisfaction received from consuming a good – be it 
income or a meal of bushmeat (see Ostrom, 2010; Janssen et al. 2010). Such models have 
been used to investigate the effectiveness of an Integrated Conservation and Development 
Project (ICDP) designed to reduce poaching from the Serengeti, Tanzania (Barrett and 
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Arcese 1998). The results indicated that projects depending upon game meat distribution as 
a mechanism to reduce poaching are unlikely to be sustainable when game meat is a 
tradable commodity and environmental shocks reduce the productivity of labour invested in 
agriculture (Barrett and Arcese 1998). Economic models have also been used to understand 
the role of enforcement efforts in limiting illegal extraction of elephant and rhino (Milner-
Gulland and Leader-Williams 1992); and the distribution of labour to bushmeat hunting or 
agriculture (Damania et al. 2005). (Also see Johannesen (2006). 
 
Factors affecting people’s decision making can change in response to personal 
circumstances, this includes the rate at which individuals discount future events (Edwards-
Jones 2006). These dynamics are poorly understood, for example, it is assumed that the 
poor, preoccupied with survival in the present, have high discount rates which result in over-
exploitation of local resources to fulfill immediate needs with little or no resources or 
willingness to invest in the future (Moseley 2001). However, there is evidence of desperately 
poor African households choosing long-term gains despite short-term costs. For example 
evidence from food security analysts in Africa indicates that the poor often eat less in order 
to preserve productive capital and chances of producing food in the future (Moseley 2001).  
 
Social psychological factors influencing decision-making: Theories of human behaviour from 
social psychology highlight interactions of internal (e.g. attitude) and external (e.g. availability 
of resources) influences on behaviour. For example the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen 
1991) states that a person’s behaviour can be predicted by three main factors: their attitude, 
subjective norms (perceived social pressure), and the degree of control they perceive they 
have over performing a behaviour (e.g. availability of required knowledge, skills and 
resources). By quantifying the relative importance of each of these components, 
interventions aimed at changing behaviour can be designed to target the main influences on 
individuals (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). Such theories have rarely been applied to poaching. 
Where they have been, evidence indicates that a one-size-fits-all solution is unsuitable as 
the relative importance of factors driving poaching differ by region and levels of affluence 
(Marchini and MacDonald 2012). People’s internalised perceptions of what is ‘morally right 
or wrong’ are also likely to influence compliance (Winter and May 2001; Fischer et al. 2013). 
 
Individuals and the importance of social norms: People are embedded within societies where 
their interactions are mediated by institutions which shape behaviour (Ostrom 2000; Agrawal 
2001). Institutions can be formal, based on laws and regulations, or informal, based on 
social norms or traditional rules (Agrawal 2001). There is evidence that conservation 
interventions, such as the imposition of rules associated with resource use, can erode social 
norms and the institutions that enforce them. This can have negative consequences on the 
resource base and upon human well-being. Consequently, when planning interventions, 
projects should consider how their actions may influence existing norms and institutions that 
may be providing some positive natural resource management (Gelcich et al. 2006; Jones et 
al. 2008). Further, there is evidence that projects failing to understand the specific context of 
wildlife uses and livelihood practices prior to implementation fail to achieve their objectives. 
For example, the failure of Zambia’s community-based wildlife program (Administrative 
Management Design for Game Management Areas, ADMADE) in the Munyamadzi Corridor, 
Luangwa Valley, has been attributed to erroneous assumptions that local residents would be 
converted to conservation as a matter of economics; and the failure to consider the cultural 
importance of the role of ‘hunter’ in lineage affiliations together with use values of wild meats 
(Marks 2001). 
 
Key finding 6 
The evidence base for claims around poverty as a driver of ivory and rhino poaching 
is thin, but that does not mean that poverty is not an important factor 
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Little attention has been given to studying the drivers of illegal natural resource extraction by 
gathering data directly from the public, which includes potential rule-breakers. This is largely 
due to the difficulties associated with studying illegal activities, with rule breakers unwilling to 
identify themselves for fear of punishment (Gavin et al. 2010; St. John et al. 2010).  
 
In the only study of its kind to date, Burn et al. (2011) explore country level drivers and 
spatial distribution of elephant poaching using data from the database Monitoring the Illegal 
Killing of Elephants (MIKE) set up by the 10th CoP of CITES in 1997. MIKE holds site-level 
carcass encounter data reported mainly through anti-poaching patrols. Data analysed were 
site by year totals of 6,337 carcasses from 66 MIKE sites in 36 range states in Africa and 
Asia between 2002 and 2009. Results indicate that sites with forest cover, such as those 
within Central Africa, experience higher levels of poaching than savannah sites, presumably 
because detection by enforcement officials is less likely in such habitats so poachers have 
greater freedom of movement Burn et al. (2011). However, it may be that states with forests 
have weaker enforcement capacity. At the country level, drivers of illegal killing that emerged 
from the analysis were poor governance and low levels of human development (Burn et al. 
2011). Stiles (2011) reported that the main reasons for elephant poaching given by those 
who participate in hunting were lack of law enforcement and poverty. Similar findings have 
been reported by others for African elephants and black rhinoceroses (Smith et al. 2003). 
Burn et al. (2011) highlight the fact that:   
 
 ‘…we [the authors] are only just beginning to make inroads into understanding the 
plethora of potential impacts – social, political, economic and ecological, and the 
causal pathways between them – on elephant poaching and illicit ivory trade’ (Burn et 
al. 2011). 
 
Key finding 7 
There are direct links between conflict zones, illegal killing of wildlife, trafficking and 
poverty  
 
Poorer communities in conflict areas lose the value of wildlife to organised militia and rebel 
groups who use ivory and rhino horn to fund their operations. Furthermore, it prevents the 
development of tourism because tourists are put off by the risks associated with a 
combination of conflict zones and poaching. Tourism is difficult to develop in areas of on-
going conflict because of the risks to international tourists and the lack of facilities. This is a 
major challenge for communities aiming to capture tourist value of wildlife in CAR, Sudan, 
DRC and the Rwanda-Uganda-DRC border areas (Lombard, 2012). The rise in poaching in 
Central African Republic and its relationships to regional security issues (Chad, Cameroon, 
CAR and Gabon) was detailed in a report by UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon (UN, 
2013).  Zakouma National Park in Chad has also suffered poaching by rebel groups to fund 
cross border wars; Garamba National Park (DRC) was used as a base by the Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) in 2012 and it used ivory poaching to underpin and finance 
operations; leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony, was based there in 2012 (UN, 2013).3 
However, the claim that new ivory wars are organised by Janjaweed militia and LRA has 
been seriously questioned – Lombard suggests these are simplistic and ‘easy labels’ used 
by Governments in the region to entice in external help or to demonise poachers as 
                                               
3
 http://www.african-parks.org/; http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/world/africa/kony-elephant-
poaching; Christy, B. ‘Blood Ivory’ National Geographic, October 2012; Keith Somerville, 
African Arguments Series (Royal African Society) Ivory Wars: How Poaching in Central Africa 
Fuels the LRA and Janjaweed, 14.01.13, http://africanarguments.org/2013/01/14/the-ivory-
wars-how-poaching-in-central-africa-fuels-the-lra-and-janjaweed-%E2%80%93-by-keith-
somerville/ 
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‘outsiders’.4 Other national parks have been used in the past to train militia, rebel 
movements; one of the best documented cases is the use of Kruger National Park by the 
South African Defence Force to train Renamo rebels in the 1980s (Duffy 1997). Poaching 
has been used as a financial underpinning for conflicts across Sub-Saharan Africa, including 
Uganda in the 1970s and 1980s (Norgrove and Hulme, 2006), Angola and Mozambique in 
the 1980s (Reeve and Ellis, 1995; Ellis, 1994; Duffy, 1999; Cochrane, 2008), and the Great 
Lakes region since 1996 (Benz and Benz, 2011).  For further discussion of the links between 
wildlife and conflict see Milburn, 2012; Humphries and Smith, 2012; Duffy 2010:113-174). 
 
As conflicts produce large scale population displacements and refugee camps, refugees and 
Internally Displaced People (IDPs) can turn to poaching to feed themselves (bushmeat) or to 
earn cash income (via poaching commercially valuable goods). A study by TRAFFIC 
East/Southern Africa found that rations provided in refugee camps in Tanzania encouraged 
people in the camps to hunt illegally to meet protein needs (see Jambiya, Milledge and 
Mtango, 2007). 
 
Key finding 8 
Trafficking can increase poverty  
 
‘The trade in wildlife and wildlife products, both domestic and international, also 
generates cash income and employment in biodiversity rich countries and can 
represent an important contribution to their GDP. When this trade is legal, 
sustainable and effectively managed it can provide benefits for local communities—
and when it is poorly managed and largely illegal, the benefits to local communities 
are lost’ (Roe, 2008a: 1). 
 
Organised crime and transnational trading networks capture the main value of ivory and 
rhino horn. Poorer people would not engage in poaching were it not for wider networks able 
to transport ivory and rhino horn out of source countries to end-user markets.  It is this 
dynamic where we can point to a link to poverty and trafficking since it is the networks 
(transport, organised crime, use of diplomatic bag) that are able to capture the real value of 
ivory and rhino horn. Poachers receive a comparatively small amount of the value, and wider 
local communities lose all potential value (see section on CBNRM/Campfire below) (Duffy, 
1999; Robbins, 2000; Bonner 1993; Ellis 1994; Reeve and Ellis 1995). The global wildlife 
trade is estimated to be worth US$300 billion per year, and much of the value is lost to 
communities who live with wildlife; and so harnessing the wildlife trade can form a key part of 
poverty reduction strategies (Roe, 2008a: 1; also see Roe et al. 2011).  
 
Corruption and collusion by parks agencies, government officials, and private sector 
businesses allow ivory and rhino horn to be trafficked from source countries in Africa to end 
user markets in Asia. This further impoverishes populations because the value of these 
commodities is captured by corrupt individuals rather than the country as a whole. The role 
of corruption and organised crime in rhino and ivory trafficking is so significant that Interpol 
launched Operation Worthy in 2012 to combat trafficking and poaching in Africa (as part of 
Project Wisdom, to tackle ivory and rhino horn poaching funded by DEFRA and IFAW).5 In 
2007 EIA claimed that organised gangs were moving into environmental crime, because it 
was low risk but high value. They have lobbied the UN Convention Against Transnational 
                                               
4
 Lombard. L. (2012) The Tangled Brokering of Militarized Conservation in Central Africa, paper 
presented at the American Association of Anthropologists; Lombard, L. ‘Ivory Wars’ New York 
Times 20.09.12.  
5
 http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2012/PR049 
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Organized Crime and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to take 
wildlife crime seriously and treat it as on a par with drugs and arms trafficking.6 
 
 
                                               
6
 Gangs moving into environment crime’, The Daily Telegraph, 06.06.07. 
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SECTION 2 
Policy responses 
 
Changing individual’s behaviours 
Interventions typically combine approaches from three broad categories (St. John et al. 
2013): 
 
Negative incentives: typically enforcement designed to deter illegal activities such as 
poaching, but also includes campaigns to alter public opinion making activities socially costly 
(e.g. campaigns against fur).  
 
Positive incentives: money or benefits in kind are given to communities or individuals for 
behaving in a certain way, e.g. refraining from illegal resource extraction. 
 
Distractions: alternative options, for example improved crop yields, are offered to reduce the 
comparative attractiveness of illegal activities.  
 
Negative incentives – enforcement  
Evidence indicates that reducing effort devoted to enforcement within protected areas leads 
to increased levels of poaching. Fifty years of records from Serengeti, Tanzania show that 
the rapid decline in enforcement in 1977 resulted in large increases in poaching and the 
decline of many species. From the mid-1980s expanded budgets allowed for increased anti-
poaching patrols, as a result, poaching was greatly reduced and populations of buffalo, 
elephants, and rhinoceros showed signs of recovery (Hilborn et al. 2006).  
 
Enforcement is financially costly, consequently enforcement at a levels adequate to protect 
elephant and rhino are prohibitively expensive for most African range States. Techniques for 
optimising enforcement strategies are therefore required. To this end, studies from Luangwa 
Valley, Zambia model the influence of sentencing structure on poacher decision-making and 
how anti-poaching resource allocation relates to poaching rates (Case Study 1, Zambia). 
Further, evidence from Ghana (Case Study 2, Ghana) indicates that market raids (Martin 
2010) and monitoring enforcement-staff performance can contribute to reduced poaching as 
a result of improved staff performance (Jachmann 2008b). 
 
However, enforcement is not only financially costly it can also be costly in terms of local 
relations. Enforcement can erode trust between conservation authorities and local people by 
restricting access to resources that have an irreplaceable role in the lives of local people 
(Infield 2001). Indeed, evidence indicates that trust and legitimacy between protected area 
staff and local people are key factors related to voluntary compliance where general 
agreement with regulations does not necessarily exist (Stern 2008). 
 
Increased levels of military-style enforcement could increase poverty and alienate local 
communities. An increasingly common response is to suggest the need for greater levels of 
enforcement; this goes beyond more traditional understandings of negative incentives 
designed to encourage individuals not to engage in illegal behaviours via use of fines, 
imprisonment and public awareness campaigns (Terborgh, 1999; Oates, 1999; Hutton, 
Adams and Murombedzi, 2005; Leakey, 2001); even UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon 
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has claimed that a more militarised approach is needed (UN, 2013).  The claim that Africa is 
facing a new poaching war lends weight to this argument. Greater enforcement can be via 
greater use of arms, shoot to kill, expansion of ranger numbers, contracting anti-poaching 
out to the private sector, more use of new technologies (drones, camera traps, thermal 
imaging) greater use of fines, prosecutions etc. It is clear that greater levels of enforcement 
by states, NGOs or private sector operators may produce ‘quick wins’ in the short term. 
However, the danger is that such heavy handed tactics will be counter-productive and 
alienate local communities in the longer term (Hutton, Adams and Murombedzi, 2005; Duffy 
forthcoming; Roe et al. 2010; Neumann 2004; Butt, 2012; Lunstrum, 2013; Peluso, 1993; 
Dressler at al, 2010). Further, in the case of the rhino wars in the Zambezi Valley in the 
1990s, local communities claimed they were ‘caught in the crossfire’ between organised 
poachers and parks agencies; they were in the area collecting grass, wild food plants or 
hunting small game and were mistaken for commercial rhino hunters (Duffy, 2010: 103; 
Bonner, 1993); in the Liwonde National park in Malawi,  South African private military 
company personnel were used to train the park rangers; and  later parks staff  were 
implicated in over 300 deaths, 325 disappearances, 250 rapes and numerous instances of 
torture between 1998-2000 in the Liwonde National Park alone (Neumann, 2004: 830). 
 
Positive incentives – integrating local people into the management of natural 
resources 
Since the 1980’s efforts aiming to integrate local people in conservation efforts have gained 
wide support (see for example Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDP) 
and Community Based Natural Resource Management). Strategies for achieving 
participation have usually focused on economic links between people in communities and 
protected areas. For example, the potential income to be made from alternative livelihood 
strategies including safari tourism, trophy hunting, or sale of products (Barrett and Arcese 
1995). However, most of Africa’s protected areas do not contribute significantly to reducing 
poverty (Infield and Namara 2001). Barriers to realising economic potential include 
international trade restrictions under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES)7, access to markets, and the isolated nature of many sites from 
infrastructure sufficient to support international tourism. For a review of issues associated 
with ICDPs see Hughes and Flintan (2001). 
 
The focus on economic incentives results from the theory that market forces will protect the 
environment. However, despite a range of initiatives and considerable donor investment it 
has proved difficult to provide tangible benefits from conservation to local communities in 
Africa largely because most protected areas do not create sufficient revenue to off-set the 
costs to communities of maintaining them (Emerton 1998; Newmark and Hough 2000; 
Norton-Griffiths and Southey 1995). In addition, evidence indicates that alternative 
livelihoods can become additional so whilst household well-being may increase, illegal 
natural resources extraction may continue (Ferraro and Kramer 1997; also see Janssen et 
al. 2010; Ostrom, 2010).  
 
Decentralisation of natural resource management has also increased in popularity since the 
mid-1980s. There is some evidence that higher shares of potential revenue are collected 
under systems of decentralised forest management (Danish Centre of Forest Landscape 
and Planning 2007). However, elite capture has proven to be problematic. For example, 
benefits arising from the decentralisation of forests in Cameroon are typically captured by 
bureaucrats and state officials (Case Study 3, Cameroon) (Larson and Soto 2008). Also see 
example of Campfire in Zimbabwe (discussed under ‘Legalisation’ section, as well as 
Buscher and Dressler, 2012; Dressler et al. 2010). 
                                               
7
 There is insufficient information and/or widespread disagreement about both conservation 
and livelihood impacts of trade bans (Roe et al. 2002). 
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Distractions – offering alternatives to illegal poaching 
By paying a premium on agricultural crops, an ICDP in Ghana aimed to reduce the amount 
of time hunter-farmers allocated to hunting by making agriculture more profitable. However, 
rather than reducing the pressure on bushmeat species Damania et al. (2005) suggest that 
hunter-farmers would invest some of their increased income in new, more efficient, hunting 
gear enabling them to target more economically valuable species. As a result the impact of 
increasing the profitability of agriculture on reducing illegal hunting was ambiguous 
(Damania et al. 2005). 
  
Evidence from ICDPs highlights the importance of conditionality. Evidence from the 
Serengeti-Mara ecosystem emphasises the critical importance of linking the transfer of 
benefits to measurable conservation goals. For example, where the aim is to stop poaching 
within a protected area, benefits should ideally only be received by people who do not poach 
otherwise the scheme does not create an incentive to alter behaviour from poaching to other 
legal activities that contribute to household well-being (Johannesen 2006; Dressler et al. 
2010). 
   
Based on the lessons learned about the importance of conditionality, payments for 
ecosystem services (PES) has been proposed as a promising alternative (Pagiola 2008). 
PES can be described as a voluntary transaction in which a provider of a service receives 
benefit from a buyer, conditional upon that service being provided at a required standard 
(Engel et al. 2008). Large-scale PES schemes have been established in a number of 
countries with strong institutional frameworks capable of facilitating monitoring, enforcement 
and outside validation of service providers (for examples: Pagiola 2008; Dobbs & Pretty 
2008). However, weak institutional frameworks and lack of clear natural resource and land 
tenure rights typify much of sub-Saharan Africa, which means there are no straightforward 
links between PES and poverty reduction (Agrawal et al. 2008; Corbera, Brown and Badger, 
2007). While other critics fundamentally question the underlying principles of PES, arguing 
that it serves to further embed a neoliberal approach to the environment, which is ultimately 
counterproductive (Buscher et al. 2012) 
 
Tourism as a route to poverty reduction 
Tourism is often promoted as the answer to poverty reduction via e.g. employment 
opportunities, community run lodges,  and handicrafts  to allow poorer communities to 
capture the value of wildlife (Ashley, Roe and Goodwin, 2001; Meyer, 2008; Spenceley and 
Meyer, 2012). In a recent report to CITES, Head of UNEP, Achim Steiner claimed that 
trafficking and poaching robbed local communities of the chance to develop tourism, and 
therefore threatened livelihoods (UNEP, CITES, IUCN, TRAFFIC (2013).8 However, this link 
is too simplistic. Communities are often unable to develop tourism initiatives because they 
are located in areas with low levels of wildlife, inadequate transport links and facilities to 
service international tourism markets. Furthermore, there is good evidence of how tourism 
initiatives are subject to elite capture at the community level, national level (government 
officials, private businesses) and the international scale (by large tour operators) (Fletcher, 
2011; Mbaiwa et al. 2008; Neves, 2010; Adams and Infield, 2003; Duffy 2010; Southgate, 
2003; Honey, 1999; Sandbrook, 2008; Murombedzi, 2001). 
 
                                               
8
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Legalisation of the ivory and rhino horn trade  
A number of Southern African states (South Africa, Namibia, Zambia, Zimbabwe) have 
argued that legalisation of trade needs to be considered. As with the debate on the trade in 
narcotics, the argument is made that legalisation will take profits away from organised crime, 
traffickers and poaching rings; legalisation could ensure that profits from wildlife trading will 
flow to states and local communities to alleviate poverty and reinvest in conservation. This 
was a key underpinning argument for the development of community oriented conservation 
and poverty reduction initiatives; the best known is Campfire in Zimbabwe (see Abernsperg-
Traun, M., C. O’Criodain and D. Roe (eds), 2011). The rationale was that local communities 
should have full control of wildlife resources in their area to sell as sport hunting trophies, 
sources of ivory and rhino horn on the international market or to use wildlife as a source of 
protein. The revenue would then be used to alleviate poverty. If returns were spent locally, at 
the ward level, and if village populations were small, then the value of wildlife could be 
remarkable and make a significant difference to people’s lives. In two villages in particular, 
Mahenye and Masoka, Murphree has documented substantial improvements (Murphree, 
2001; Murphree, 2005). However, Campfire was increasingly criticised as top down and 
failing to disburse promised benefits to communities. Equally the global level ivory and rhino 
horn trade bans under CITES prevented capture of the full value of wildlife (Hulme and 
Murphree (eds) 2001; Duffy, 2013; Ribot, 2004; Murombedzi, 1999; Dzingirai, 2003; 
Manjengwa and Anstey (eds) 2009; Murphree, 1995; South and Wyatt, 2011). 
 
Conservation oriented NGOs such as WWF, IFAW and EIA have argued that the on-going 
debates around legalisation of ivory and rhino horn via CITES could provide an incentive to 
poach. Expectation of future management policies can affect commodity prices thus 
influencing incentives to poach (Keane et al. 2008).  Kremer and Morcom (2000) suggested 
that anticipated future scarcity of elephant ivory, whether the result of foreseen increases in 
anti-poaching efforts, extinction, or trade bans, would increase current market prices and 
thus poaching and argued that if governments could commit to tough anti-poaching efforts 
incentives to poach may be reduced. However, Bulte et al. (2003) argue that the CITES ban 
on the trade in ivory may actually create incentives for governments to harvest their elephant 
populations to extinction if the prices for stored ivory are sufficiently high and if extinction is 
expected to precipitate the lifting of the trade ban (Keane et al. 2008).  
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Case Studies 1 Luangwa Valley, Zambia 
Case Study 1: Enforcement and elephants, Luangwa Valley, Zambia – sentencing 
strategies 
 
Stimulated by high ivory prices, high levels of poaching in the 1970’s and 1980’s threatened 
the African elephant (Loxodonta africana) with extinction prompting debate on how illegal 
hunting should be controlled in elephants’ range states where government resources are 
limited (Keane et al. 2008). 
 
From 1972 to mid-1980’s the elephant population of Luangwa Valley, Zambia lost c. 75% of 
its 100,000 population and despite sufficient investment 1979, anti-poaching patrols failed to 
prevent further decline (Leader-Williams and Albon 1988). Evidence suggests that whilst 
anti-poaching patrols were well-motivated, they were insufficiently numerous to control 
hunting across the area (Leader-Williams et al. 1990). Models have been used to study the 
interaction between law enforcement and economic incentives for poaching elephants and 
rhino in Luangwa Valley between 1970 and 1985 (Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams 
1992). Exploring how sentencing strategies affected the decisions of poachers in relation to 
changes in detection rate, penalty and economic variables were explored. Results indicated 
that varying penalties in accordance with the number of trophies possessed by a poacher 
was in theory a more effective tool against poaching than a fixed penalty. However, the 
probability of capture remained significant in the poacher's decision to hunt (Milner-Gulland 
and Leader-Williams 1992). 
  
Enforcement and elephants, Luangwa Valley, Zambia – resource allocation 
Jachmann and Billiouw (1997) investigated the relationship between elephant poaching and 
resource allocation by the Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project (LIRDP) to 
law enforcement in terms of budget and human resources between 1988 and 1995. The 
LIRDP covered the South Luangwa National Park (9050 Km2) and the Lupande Game 
Management Area (4950 km2) within which 14 scout camps were located. Enforcement 
activities included foot-patrols by groups of six to ten scouts each lasting for around 10 days, 
and following-up on intelligence supplied by informers from outside the project area.  Cash 
rewards were paid to scouts or porters supporting the scout team for information that lead to 
an arrest or confiscation of firearms or trophies.  
 
Results indicate that fluctuations in the number of elephants killed during this period could be 
attributed solely to a steeply increased enforcement budget which increased the density of 
scouts and porters per km2 in addition to the number of effective patrol and investigation 
days with no need to invoke any influence in the 1990 CITES ban on trade in ivory. 
However, the number of cash rewards paid was the most influential factor associated with 
fluctuations in levels of elephant poaching observed across the study period (Jachmann and 
Billiouw 1997). Jachmann and Billiouw (1997) highlight the positive influence of improved 
morale amongst scouts generated by the payment of bonuses and support of porters who, in 
addition to their role as porters provide additional man-power during conflict situations with 
poachers. 
 
 
 13 
 
Case Studies 2 Enforcement and elephants, Ghana 
Case Study 2: Enforcement and elephants, Ghana – monitoring staff performance 
Monitoring the performance of enforcement staff can play an important role in reducing 
illegal activities in protected areas. Poaching was reduced by 72% in four of the six protected 
areas where staff performance was evaluated and used for adaptive management. Staff 
performance improved firstly because management became aware of poor performance and 
responded accordingly and secondly because enforcement staff became aware of how well 
staff performed in other protected areas stimulating enhanced motivation and competition 
between sites to be the best (i.e. the site with the least illegal activity) (Jachmann 2008b). 
The impact of monitoring staff performance and feeding the results into an adaptive 
management strategy effectively doubled the number of days enforcement staff spent on 
patrol, this dramatically reduced the number of elephants killed (Martin 2010).  
 
Raiding markets 
In 2008 shops in Accra identified as stocking the largest quantities of ivory for sale where 
raided by the Ghana Police and Wildlife Division. Several hundred kilos of ivory curios were 
seized and the shop owners and assistants arrested for dealing in endangered wildlife 
products without a license. Visiting the area in 2010 Martin (2010) reported a considerable 
decline in the quantity of ivory openly on display for sale and that retailers were well aware 
that selling ivory was illegal. These findings were attributed to the 2008 police raids. Despite 
this, items were made available in a clandestine manner indicating the existence of a black 
market (Martin 2010). Whilst the considerable decline in the number of ivory curios openly 
on display would appear to reflect a considerable step in the right direction, the size of the 
black market in ivory products is unknown. 
 
Case Studies 3 Decentralisation, Cameroon 
Case Study 3: Decentralisation of natural resources, Cameroon 
Cameroon’s programme of natural resource management decentralisation includes the 
transfer of a portion of forestry fees to local governments and communities, the transfer of 
forest ownership rights to local governments, and the establishment of community forests in 
areas where communities have traditional rights (Larson and Soto 2008). The application 
process for establishing community forests is highly complex and requires the establishment 
of management committees. Generally, these committees are set up, in collusion with 
bureaucrats, in ways that promote elite capture, conflict, and corruption, the result being the 
emergence of a class of nouveaux riches. Whilst co-management agreements may increase 
participation of some local actors, they may further marginalise local communities and 
resource users (Larson and Soto 2008). 
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